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A Call for Collaboration
Michael J. Zpevak*
In ages of change affecting many,
many must change to effect a new age.
At precisely the time we most need to work together to give birth to
the mammoth child we call the "National Information Infrastructure" (NII),
why does it seem that so often we are working at cross purposes? Instead
of repeatedly straining to prove that "the pen is mightier than the sword,"
we, the drafters of the Information Age, should be co-authoring this critical
chapter of American industry with an unprecedented level of cooperation.
We should be writing, shoulder to shoulder, with free-flowing ideas
exchanged in a sincere and enthusiastic spirit. This Article is a "call for
collaboration" to all those currently immersed in the daunting task of
penning the tome that is the future of telecommunications.
If the first step in solving any problem is recognition that a problem
exists, then we should already be at the second step, which is determining
why the problem exists. Why, then, do we find ourselves almost always
working against, rather than with, one another these days?
The easy target for blame is competition. In today's increasingly
competitive communications market, or so the argument goes, what could
one possibly expect but constant, vigorous rivalry among market participants before regulatory and legislative bodies charged with the ultimate
establishment of national policy? Easy targets are often the wrong ones,
however, and such is the case here.
To be sure, heightened levels of competition in recent years have not
facilitated the solidarity and cooperation we clearly need to move the
communications industry forward at the optimal pace. In some instances,
a by-product of competition admittedly has been the opposite phenomenon.

* Senior Attorney-Federal Relations, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. B.A.
St. Louis University, magna cum laude, 1972; J.D. St. Louis University, cum laude, 1976.
Adjunct Professor (telecommunications law), Webster University Graduate School, St.
Louis. The opinions expressed herein are those of the Author and not necessarily those of
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

But it is simply not logical-and, therefore, not justifiable-to place blame
on a traditional facet of American enterprise.
To the contrary, magnified competition has only caused market
participants to intensify what would naturally be their "knee jerk" reactions
to various regulatory proposals under any circumstances. It has not, this
writer respectfully submits, caused the lack of accordance that currently
impedes our collective progress. More likely, the impediment has been the
result of the manner in which regulatory proceedings have recently come
to be handled, beyond the initial reactions of docket participants and much
nearer the point where actual decisions are reached.
Not too many years ago, when the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission) was beginning to draft an order in any
important proceeding, its common practice was to invite major players on
both sides of the issues to offer ex parte presentations with a very specific
purpose. Parties were advised to come into the meetings with the
Commission staff fully prepared to identify clearly and document
persuasively all of their genuine "lines in the sand." No sabre rattling, war
talk, or chest beating-just the bottom line: "What can you absolutely not
live with in this order and why?"
In the great majority of cases, parties experienced in the ways of the
FCC knew at that point they had better be forthright, and so they were.
Furthermore, in cases where Commission personnel sensed that a party
might not have told the entire story regarding what it could and could not
live with in the forthcoming order, they exercised sound judgment and
drew their own conclusions with almost uncanny accuracy. Usually, no one
was completely satisfied with the Commission's action, but neither was
anyone so completely dissatisfied that a court appeal ensued.
Contrast that approach with what seems to have become the new
standard operating procedure at the Commission in recent years. Sometimes
parties are asked about bottom-line acceptability of -specific potential
rulings and sometimes they are not. Sometimes compromises are sought
and adopted, but too often the Commission comes down squarely on one
side with seemingly little attempt at compromise. Sometimes there is
sensitivity to the parties' "lines in the sand," but often there is not.
Consequently, court appeals are almost assured from one sector or another.
This is by no means intended to suggest that the FCC should be
castigated for its motivation in adopting this new approach. On the
contrary, we can all be assured that the motivation was eminently
admirable-the desire to accelerate needed accomplishments for our
industry and our nation. Compromise, after all, consumes time. But
honorable motivations alone do not guarantee desired results. And, in the
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regulatory world, time invested in compromise pays big dividends in time
saved by avoiding the potentially endless cycle of appeal, reversal, and
remand.
Neither does this Article seek to condemn the FCC if indeed it has
consciously moved away from the more compromise-oriented approach. On
occasion, courts have been quite derogatory about good-faith attempts at
compromise in FCC orders.' Under such circumstances, it is certainly not
hard to see how a regulatory commission may wish to avoid judicial
chastising for allegedly avoiding a decision placed within its discretion by
the law.
However, this Article advocates no such avoidance. Rather, it merely
suggests that the public interest is unlikely to be served when regulators fail
to discern and avoid, to the greatest degree possible, the affected parties'
breaking points while crafting important policy orders-despite the added
time it may take to do so. The unhappy fact of the matter is that writing
massive, multifaceted, extraordinarily complex regulatory orders of the type
frequently needed from the FCC, in such a manner that no affected party
has any colorable legal ground for appeal, is probably not humanly
possible. Therefore, the most effective course may well be writing such
orders so that, although parties can perhaps find some basis for appeal, few
if any will be motivated to do so.2
Authors solicited for this publication were invited to address the
challenges posed and faced by communications policymakers today and the
extent to which the law should respond to these challenges. Most assuredly,
the law does need to be changed in several important respects. Specifically,
it has become clear that certain legal/regulatory restrictions (such as the
Modification of Final Judgment3 and certain baseless tariff inflexibilities)
imposed upon incumbents have become more harmful than helpful to

1.
The impression created is of unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg
complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring
suppliants who have somehow to be conciliated .... The possibility of resolving
a conflict in favor of the party with the stronger case, as distinct from throwing
up one's hands and splitting the difference, was overlooked.
Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2. To substantiate the points being made herein, one could list the recent string of
cases in which the FCC has been reversed by courts of appeals, and could contrast that
record with the one the Commission enjoyed for many years prior. However, this
phenomenon is already of public record, and thus a formal accounting at this point would
serve only to cast the Commission in a negative light, which is not the intent of this Article.
3. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland
v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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competition. But those topics will be left to the many other fine contributors to this special edition of this Journal.
Instead, this writer chooses to leave readers with one final thought: No
matter what the law may say, invariably it is the manner in which the law
is carried out that has the most profound effect. For the FCC to avoid timedevouring appellate detours and return to the fastest road to the NII, it
should reengage its prior approach of seeking out the limits of tolerance
among the affected parties before issuing its orders, and take the time to
strike reasonable compromises wherever possible. Of course, where
compromise is impossible or not in the public interest, the FCC can and
should make the final decision. However, diligence by everyone involved
should greatly limit the number of instances in which parties feel they have
no recourse other than to appeal a Commission order.
For our part, as the affected parties, we should be actively involved
in working earnestly with one another on such compromises. We should be
striving to show the FCC that common ground can be established without
losing ground. We must write the forthcoming pages of communications
history together, rather than trying to tear one another's proposed pages out
of the book.
We must collaborate.

